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The Influence of the  
Universal Declaration as Law 
JOHN DUGARD* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as we—as opposed to 
many politicians and students!—all know, was a non-binding 
resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.  It has no 
binding legal effect except insofar as it has become customary 
international law or been translated into treaty form.  Consequently, 
in assessing its influence as ―law,‖ it is necessary to determine which 
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have 
become custom or treaty law. 
I do not wish to embark on an examination of which provisions of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) qualify as 
customary rules.  Clearly, some, such as the prohibitions on torture, 
detention without trial, and discrimination, have become customary 
rules.  Clearly some, such as the right to leisure in Article 24, have 
not.  Instead I wish to focus on the International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights, and the International Covenant of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, which were drafted, and have been 
implemented, with a view to giving effect to the UDHR ―as law.‖  
Today it is pointless to examine the UDHR as ―law‖ without an 
examination of its legally binding offspring, the Covenants.  They, 
together with the UDHR and the Optional Protocol to the Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights,1 constitute the International Bill of 
 
* Professor of Law, Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria; Visiting Professor of 
Law, Duke University School of Law. 
1. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened 
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.   
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Rights. 
I could embark on a study of the manner in which these Covenants 
have been ratified and monitored by their respective monitoring 
committees.  But I shall not do so.  Instead I shall argue that the 
UDHR and the Covenants together constitute a body of human rights 
law that gives substance to the rights enshrined in the human rights 
provisions—Articles 55 and 56—of the United Nations Charter.  As a 
consequence, their substantive principles, as opposed to the 
procedural rules for implementation in the Covenants, are binding on 
all member states of the United Nations under the Charter itself. 
It will be recalled that in the years following the adoption of the 
UDHR it was argued that the UDHR gave legal substance to the 
human rights provisions of the Charter.  This argument was generally 
rejected on the ground that it was not possible to amend the Charter 
by resolution of the General Assembly.  Also it was pointed out, 
rightly, that the language of the UDHR was exhortatory and too 
imprecise to impose legal obligations.  The same cannot be said of 
the Covenants.  They were drafted as legal instruments and describe 
with clarity and qualification the rights they seek to protect.  On the 
other hand, the Covenants do not purport to amend the Charter, nor 
have they followed the required procedure for amendment to the 
Charter.   
Today there is no doubt that the human rights provisions of the 
Charter are legally binding.  The International Court of Justice 
confirmed this in the Namibia Opinion of 1971.2  It is also clear that 
the human rights provisions are too broadly drafted, too general in 
their language to give a clear indication of the rights protected.  This 
means that U.N. bodies charged with the task of applying human 
rights standards and human rights law must have regard to some 
lodestars.  The sweeping provisions of the UDHR are too vague and 
imprecise for this purpose.  But their offspring, the Covenants, are 
not.  Consequently, the political and judicial organs of the U.N., in 
applying the human rights provisions of the Charter and in being 
guided by human rights standards, must be guided by the substantive 
provisions of the Covenants, the International Bill of Rights. 
In my brief intervention I cannot provide a comprehensive over-
 
2. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 57 (June 21) [hereinafter ―Namibia Opinion‖]. 
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view of how the political organs of the United Nations, particularly 
the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Human Rights 
Council (previously the Commission on Human Rights), as well as 
the judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Court of 
Justice, have applied human rights law.  That they have all been 
guided by human rights law on occasion is incontestable.  The 
General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions that seek to 
advance civil and political, economic, social, and cultural rights.  The 
Security Council has likewise adopted resolutions that express 
concern about human rights violations.  Most of these resolutions 
have been adopted under Chapter VI of the Charter but several have 
been adopted under Chapter VII.  Witness the resolution referring the 
situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court and Resolution 
418 of 1977 imposing a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa 
because of its policy of apartheid.3  The Commission on Human 
Rights and now the Human Rights Council are committed to 
promoting and defending human rights.  And the International Court 
of Justice, which is not a human rights court, has handed down many 
decisions that assert the rights and obligations of States in respect of 
human rights.4   
All is not well, however, with the state of human rights in the 
world today.  And in part the political organs of the United Nations, 
and its Secretariat, are to blame.  Of course, the political organs are 
only as committed to human rights as their member States allow.  
Consequently, insofar as blame attaches, it is to the majorities in 
these organs.  In my intervention I will focus on three issues that 
augur ill for human rights: first, the movement of the Security 
Council away from the notion that the violation of human rights can 
constitute a threat to international peace under Chapter VII of the 
Charter; second, the failure of the Security Council and Secretariat 
(that is, the Secretary-General) to implement an Advisory Opinion of 
the International Court of Justice on a particular human rights matter; 
and third, the failure of the Human Rights Council to concern itself 
sufficiently with human rights violations in the developing world. 
 
3. In March 2005, France proposed a resolution to the U.N. Security Council that would 
refer Darfur to the International Criminal Court.  S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 
(Mar. 31, 2005).  U.N. Resolution 418 imposed a mandatory arms embargo against apartheid 
South Africa.  S.C. Res. 418, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977). 
4. See SHIV R. S. BEDI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW BY THE JUDGES OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (2007).  
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THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL PEACE, AND  
HUMAN RIGHTS 
It seems trite, at least to the lay person, that a human rights 
situation in a particular State can threaten international peace and 
security.  For years the Security Council resisted such a conclusion as 
it sought to balance Chapter VII with Article 2(7) of the Charter.  But 
in 1977 the Security Council at last resolved that the excesses of 
apartheid in South Africa—a purely internal situation—constituted a 
threat to international peace under Chapter VII that warranted 
measures under Article 41.5  Resolution 418 was couched in language 
that suggested that some external element might possibly be 
involved.  Accordingly, paragraph one of the resolution reads that the 
Security Council: ―Determines, having regard to the policies and acts 
of the South Africa government, that the acquisition by South Africa 
of arms and related materiel constitutes a threat to the maintenance of 
international peace and security.‖6  
There was also passing reference in the second preambular 
paragraph of Resolution 418 to the fact that South Africa’s military 
build-up and attacks on neighboring states disturbed international 
peace.7  However, this was mere window dressing designed to 
appease those who might still have had doubts as to whether an 
internal situation might constitute a threat to international peace.  The 
Security Council debates make it clear that the real reason for the 
resolution was the suppression of political opposition by the 
apartheid regime in the wake of the killing of Steve Biko.  That is, it 
addressed a purely internal human rights violation. 
Despite the victory for the proposition that an internal situation 
might constitute a threat to international peace, there has been an 
attempt to deny this proposition and to return to the primacy of 
Article 2(7).  Surprisingly, such an argument has been advanced by 
 
5. S.C. Res. 418, supra note 3.  Article 41 of the U.N. Charter states: ―The Security 
Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed 
to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the United Nations to 
apply such measures.  These may include complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, 
and the severance of diplomatic relations.‖ 
6. S.C. Res. 418, supra note 3, ¶ 1. 
7. Id. pmbl. (―Recognizing that the military build-up by South Africa and its persistent 
acts of aggression against the neighboring States seriously disturb the security of those 
States.‖). 
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the African National Congress government of South Africa, the same 
political body that lobbied hard for the notion that an internal 
situation—apartheid—constituted a threat to international peace and 
security. 
This argument forms the basis of South Africa’s protection of the 
rule of Robert Mugabe from international scrutiny.  However, it was 
more publicly aired when, in 2007, South Africa cast its vote against 
a draft resolution before the Security Council, under Chapter VI of 
the Charter, that sought to condemn the violation of human rights by 
the military regime of Myanmar/Burma.  The resolution, introduced 
by the United States and the United Kingdom, was killed by the 
vetoes of China and the Russian Federation.  But South Africa also 
voted against the resolution on the ground that the draft resolution did 
not ―fit with the Charter mandate conferred on the Security Council, 
which is to deal with matters that are a threat to international peace 
and security.‖8  That is, an internal human rights situation could not 
constitute a threat to international peace and security.  
This decision has been explained by Dire Tladi of the South 
African Department of Foreign Affairs Legal Affairs—in an article 
that does ―not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs‖—as follows.9  A purely internal situation cannot 
constitute a threat to international peace.  There must, in addition, be 
some armed conflict or potential for armed conflict between States.10  
Apartheid, says Tladi, was condemned by the Security Council 
because of the threat it posed to neighboring States and not because 
of the internal situation in South Africa itself.11  However, as pointed 
out above, the debates in the Security Council make it clear that 
Resolution 418 was prompted by internal repression and not external 
aggression.  
South Africa, under President Mbeki, took upon itself to lead the 
developing world by identifying the lowest common denominator of 
opinion among such States and to exalt this opinion to a foreign 
policy position.  South Africa’s argument that the Security Council 
 
8. U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 5619th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5619 (Jan. 12, 2007) 
(statement of Ambassador Kumalo of South Africa). 
9. Dire Tladi, Strict Positivism, Moral Arguments, Human Rights and the Security 
Council: South Africa and the Myanmar Vote, 8 AFRICAN HUM. RTS. L. J. 23, 30 (2008). 
10. Id. (citing ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL 144 (2004)). 
11. Id. at 34. 
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should not, and cannot, concern itself with internal human rights 
situations is, unfortunately, shared by many other States in the 
developing world.  In part, it reflects hostility to the skewed com-
position of the Security Council, and in part, hostility to human rights 
and the idea that the violation of human rights is of concern to all 
States.  One hopes that the new government in South Africa will 
abandon this policy and return to the more enlightened philosophy of 
the Mandela era. 
There have been important developments in international law since 
the adoption of Resolution 418 in 1977.  That certain norms are 
peremptory and that certain obligations have an erga omnes reach is 
now accepted.  Moreover, the notion of an international duty to 
protect in situations involving a serious violation of human rights is 
accepted by the United Nations.12  These developments have all been 
inspired by the International Bill of Rights.  In these circumstances, 
there can be no substance in the argument that an internal situation 
cannot threaten international peace for the purpose of Security 
Council action.   
The Mbeki doctrine seriously undermines the international pro-
tection of human rights and must be repudiated. 
THE REFUSAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ATTEMPT TO 
IMPLEMENT THE ADVISORY OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE ON THE WALL 
In 2004 the International Court of Justice found, in an advisory 
opinion, that the wall Israel is constructing within Palestinian 
territory violates norms of international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
human rights law.13  It stated that the construction of the wall ―con-
stitutes breaches by Israel of various of its obligations under the 
applicable IHL and human rights instruments.‖14  The human rights 
instruments in question were the two Covenants and the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child.15 
 
12. See, for example, the General Assembly’s acceptance at the World Summit of the 
High Level Panel’s recommendation in the Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2004). 
13. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 193–94 (July 9). 
14. Id. 
15. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1577 
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The Opinion is advisory and therefore not binding on States, 
particularly those that have persistently objected to it (notably Israel 
and the United States).  Thus Israel may be faulted for failing to 
desist from violating its obligations under IHL and human rights law 
but not for failing to comply with the advisory opinion.  The position 
of the United Nations and its Secretary-General is less defensible.  
The Opinion was requested and subsequently approved by the 
General Assembly, adopted by 150 votes in favor (including the 
European Union (EU) and Russian Federation), with six against and 
ten abstentions.16  It is therefore the law of the United Nations17 and 
as such must be implemented by the Secretary-General, who acts as 
the executive officer of the United Nations.  But, despite this, the 
Secretary-General, both in his public statements (for instance at the 
Annapolis meeting in 2007) and in words and deeds on behalf of the 
Quartet (the U.N. body charged by the Security Council with 
promoting peace in the region), refuses even to acknowledge the 
Opinion.  This is starkly illustrated by the most recent statement of 
the Quartet on September 26, 2008,18 which, like its predecessors, 
makes no mention whatsoever of the Advisory Opinion and the need 
to persuade or compel Israel to comply with the Opinion—as the law 
of the U.N.! 
The failure of the U.N. in general, and its Secretary-General in 
particular, to even attempt to implement the Advisory Opinion on the 
wall compares unfavorably with the response of the U.N. to the 1971 
Advisory Opinion on Namibia.19  This Opinion was treated by the 
U.N. as the legal framework for Namibian independence.  The 
Secretary-General symbolizes the U.N.  He is its leader.  His 
unwillingness to uphold an Opinion by the judicial arm of the U.N. 
shows a lack of commitment to the Rule of Law in general and, in 
this case, to human rights in particular. 
THE FAILURE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
The Human Rights Council (HRC), like its predecessor, the 
Commission on Human Rights, owes its existence to the International 
 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
16. G.A. Res. ES-10/15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/15 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
17. See Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, 
Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 23, 46–47 (June 1) (Lauterpacht, J., separate opinion). 
18. Statement, The Quartet, No. S319/08 (Sept. 26, 2008). 
19. Namibia Opinion, supra note 2. 
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Bill of Rights.  The HRC is designed to promote and protect the 
rights enshrined in the UDHR.  Whether it acts in an even-handed 
manner to achieve this goal is, however, open to serious doubt.  The 
HRC consists of the representatives of States and is a political body.  
Nevertheless the politicization of the HRC, and so of human rights, 
has surpassed expectations.  It is common knowledge that the HRC 
has devoted too little attention to human rights violations in the 
developing world—such as Zimbabwe, Darfur and Burma—and 
devoted too much attention to Israel and Palestine.  Critics of the 
HRC from the West focus on this phenomenon without addressing 
the cause.  They fail to ask the question whether the West’s pro-
tection of Israel in the Security Council, the Quartet, and the EU may 
explain the determination of the developing world to use the HRC as 
an instrument for attacking Israel.  They fail to ask whether the 
West’s double standard on Israel may explain the double standard 
applied by the developing world in respect of its members. 
As Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, I have had a unique opportunity to 
observe the behavior of States in the HRC.  I have experienced the 
frustration of the developing world over the failure of the West to 
take Israel’s violations of IHL and human rights seriously.  I have 
heard delegates from the developing world ask how the West can 
refuse to hold Israel to account for its violations of numerous U.N. 
resolutions, ranging from the illegality of settlements to violations of 
the most basic freedoms.  How can the West, they ask, which claims 
to respect the Rule of Law and human rights, completely ignore the 
2004 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
wall?  How can the West, which controls the Quartet, allow the 
Quartet to completely ignore Israel’s violations of IHL and human 
rights as a factor to be considered in the peace process?   
At the same time, I have heard delegates from the West complain, 
rightly, about the manner in which the developing States protect their 
own members from scrutiny on human rights grounds and about the 
manner in which the HRC fails to show sufficient concern about 
issues such as Zimbabwe, Sudan’s Darfur, and Burma/Myanmar.  I 
do not have a solution to this problem.  However, I do believe that if 
the West were to take Israel’s violations of human rights more 
seriously, both in word and deed, it might be easier for the West to 
persuade the developing world to be less protective of its own 
member States.  The West must face the fact that the Palestinian issue 
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is the litmus test for human rights as far as the developing world is 
concerned.  If the West fails to show concern for human rights in the 
Palestinian Territory, the developing world will conclude that human 
rights are a tool employed by the West against regimes it dislikes and 
not a universal and objective instrument for the measurement of the 
treatment of people throughout the world. 
CONCLUSION 
As a component of the International Bill of Rights, the UDHR is 
―law.‖  In particular, it is the law of the U.N.  As such, it should 
guide State delegations in their decision-making in the U.N.  As the 
law of the U.N., it is legally binding on the Secretary-General.  The 
above three issues show that the International Bill of Rights ceases to 
be the ―law‖ when there is no political will to enforce and implement 
it.  In some situations, politics prevails over the law.  Of course, this 
occurs in national societies too, but the international order, without 
effective enforcement and compulsory adjudication, is more prone to 
political ―override‖ and manipulation.  The task facing the inter-
national human rights lawyer today is not to establish that the 
International Bill of Rights is ―law‖—that is no longer seriously 
questioned—but to ensure that it will be respected as law across the 
board by political decision-makers.   
 
